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Abstract - Random number generators (RNG) are an 
important resource in many areas: cryptography (both 
quantum and classical), probabilistic computation (Monte 
Carlo methods), numerical simulations, industrial testing 
and labeling, hazard games, scientific research,  etc. Because 
today's computers are deterministic, they can not create 
random numbers unless complemented with a RNG. 
Randomness of a RNG can be precisely, scientifically 
characterized and measured. Especially valuable is the 
information-theoretic provable RNG (True RNG – TRNG) 
which, at state of the art, seem to be possible only by use of 
physical randomness inherent to certain (simple) quantum 
systems. On the other hand, current industry standard 
dictates use of RNG's based on free running oscillators 
(FRO) whose randomness is derived from electronics noise 
present in logic circuits and which cannot be strictly proven. 
This approach is currently used in 3-rd and 4-th generation 
FPGA and ASIC hardware, unsuitable for realization of 
quantum TRNG. We compare weak and strong aspects of 
the two approaches and discuss possibility of building 
quantum TRNG in the recently appeared Mixed Signal 
FPGA technology. Finally, we discuss several examples 
where use of a TRNG is critical and show how it can 
significantly improve security of cryptographic systems. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
True random numbers, or more precisely 
nondeterministic random number generators, seem to be 
of an ever increasing importance. Random numbers are 
essential in cryptography (classical, stochastic and 
quantum), Monte Carlo calculations, numerical 
simulations, statistical research, randomized algorithms, 
lottery etc. Today, true random numbers are probably 
most critically required in cryptography and its numerous 
applications to cyber-security such as: Smart Energy Grid, 
e-banking, internet trade, prepaid cards etc. 
In applications where provability is essential, 
randomness sources (if involved) must also be provably 
random otherwise the whole chain of proofs will collapse.  
In cryptography, where due to the Kerhoff's principle all 
parts of protocols are publicly known except some secret 
(the key or other information) known only to the sender 
and the recipient, it is clear that secret must not be 
calculable by an eavesdropper i.e. it must be random. For 
example the famous BB84 quantum key distribution 
protocol [1] (described below) would be completely 
insecure if only an eavesdropper could calculate (or 
predict) either Alice's random numbers or Bob's random 
numbers or both. From analysis of the secret key rate 
presented therein it is obvious that any guessability of 
random numbers by the eavesdropper would leak relevant 
information to him, thus diminishing the effective key 
rate. It is intriguing (and obvious) that in the case that the 
eavesdropper could calculate the numbers exactly, the 
cryptographic potential of the BB84 protocol would be 
zero. This example shows that the local random number 
generators assumed in BB84 are essential for its security 
and should not be taken for granted.  
II. RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION 
 
Due to the Kerhoff's principle, the definition of a 
random number generator suitable for cryptography must 
include that even if everything is known about the 
generator (schematic, algorithms etc.) it still must produce 
totally unpredictable bits.  
Historically, there are two approaches to random 
number generation: algorithmic (pseudorandom) and by 
hardware (nondeterministic). Without loss of generality in 
the rest of the article we will assume that generators 
produce random bits (binary values 0 or 1).  
Pseudorandom number generators (PRNG) are well 
known in the art and we are not going to address them 
here. A PRNG is nothing more than a mathematical 
formula which produces deterministic, periodic sequence 
of numbers which is completely determined by the initial 
state called seed. By definition such generators are not 
provably random. In practice, PRNG's feature perfect 
balance between 0's and 1's (zero bias) but also strong 
long-range correlations which undermine cryptographic 
strength and can show up as unexpected errors in Monte 
Carlo calculations and modeling. 
Advantages of PRNG's are their low cost, ease of 
implementation and user friendliness, especially in a 
CPU-available environment such as a PC computer.  
In contrast to that, hardware random number 
generators (RNG for short) extract randomness form 
physical processes that behave in a nondeterministic way 
which makes them better candidates for true random 
number generation. Examples of such physical processes 
are: Johnson's noise, Zener noise, radioactive decay, 
photon path splitting at the two-way beam splitter, etc [2]-
[6]. Unlike the PRNG's hardware generators suffer from 
bias b, defined as the difference of probabilities of 1's and 
0's:  
 b = p(1) - p(0)                          (1) 
and long-range correlations. Our definition of PRNG is 
not to be confused with PRNG's implemented in 
hardware. 
A. Noise based RNG's 
Johnson's effect ideally creates random voltage on 
terminals of any resistive material which is held at a 
temperature higher than absolute zero. Johnson's noise is 
due to random thermal motion of the quantized electric 
charge (i.e. carriers). However, long-range carrier 
correlations in conductors cause correlations in 
movements of electric charges and therefore the resulting 
voltage is not completely random.  
Zener noise (in semiconductor Zener diodes) is caused 
by tunneling of carriers through quantum barrier of ideally 
constant height and width. If current is sufficiently low, 
individual "jumps" of carriers through barrier will be seen 
as voltage peaks across the diode forming a pink noise of 
perfect randomness. However, Zener effect is never found 
well isolated in physical devices from other effects nor is 
the quantum barrier constant. Most of the fore mentioned 
processes in resistors and Zener diodes have some 
memory effect. This means that an instantaneous voltage 
across the device depends on voltages in the (near) past 
and this in turn leads to a correlation among random 
numbers extracted there from. The biggest problem here is 
that non-randomness of noise sources can not be well 
characterized, measured or even controlled during 
fabrication. Furthermore, noise sources produce rather 
tiny voltages that need to be strongly amplified before 
conversion to digital form which introduces further 
deviations from randomness due to the limited amplifier 
bandwidth and gain non-linearity.    
The general idea of noise based hardware RNG is the 
following. The random voltage is sampled periodically 
and compared to a certain pre-defined threshold: if higher 
then „1“ is generated, otherwise „0“ is generated (Fig. 2). 
It is obvious that threshold can be set so that the 
probabilities of 1's and 0's are roughly the same. However, 
fine tuning of the threshold poses an insurmountable time-
consuming problem and can never be done properly. For 
example, if tuning of bias to value of 0.1 requires 10 
seconds, then tuning to 10 times lower value (0.01) would 
take 100 times longer (the required time scales as square 
of improvement ratio). On top of that there is a problem of 
stability: even the smallest drift of the mean value (for 
example due to temperature or supply voltage change) 
will create a large bias. Therefore some kind of post-
processing is required (for example von Neumann or 
Peres de-biasing). This still does not solve the problem of 
correlations among bits which can even be enhanced by 
de-biasing procedures or changed from short-range ones 
to long-range ones (see Section D). 
 
Fig. 2. Noise based RNG. A is an analog amplifier while C is a 
comparator whose output is either 0 or 1 depending whether its input is 
below or above certain adjustable threshold. Upon request, fresh new 
random bit will sit on the output Q. 
In conclusion, a decent proof of randomness for 
present noise-based random number generators seems 
impossible because the underlying physical processes are 
not well isolated and proven to be random.  
B. Free runing oscillator RNG's 
When output of a logical inverter circuit is fed to its 
input, the circuit turns to an oscillator, so called free 
running oscillator (FRO), Fig 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Schematic diagram of a fast (left) and slow (right) FROs.  
Oscillation frequency is determined by internal delays and stray 
capacitances. 
Frequency of oscillations is typically very sensitive to 
variation of power supply voltage and temperature. Noise 
present at the input causes very fast, random jitter of 
frequency and phase. Since noise of each such circuit is 
individual it is reasonable to assume the multiple 
oscillators even when on the same chip have different 
frequencies and that their mutual phases walk off 
randomly in time.  
Basic principle of random number generation with 
FRO's is that that output of a fast FRO (which can be 
either logical 0 or logical 1) is sampled by a slow FRO. 
This is an equivalent of abrupt stopping of a quickly 
turning wheel of fortune. Because the wheel spins so 
"fast" it appears stopped at a "random" position. In case of 
two FRO's it is important that the relative phase jitter is 
random and large enough. Clearly, if there is no phase 
jitter the output will provide repetitive binary pattern.  
Current industry standard [7] dictates use of RNG's 
based on free running oscillators (FRO) whose 
randomness is derived from electronics noise present in 
logic circuits. This approach is currently used in 3-rd and 
4-th generation FPGA and ASIC hardware. As this 
infrastructure is unsuitable for realization of quantum 
RNG (see below), a FRO approach seem to be a 
reasonable viable alternative. However, semiconductor 
industry is making an enormous effort to make the noise 
as small as possible. Consequently the effect of jitter can 
be very small and cause the FRO based RNG to operate in 
nearly PRNG regime. Furthermore, present solutions 
described in the scientific journals and patents not only 
lack provability but in most cases even an attempt to 
prove randomness. 
In conclusion, FRO based RNG's are low-cost, low-
entropy solutions whose only good side is the fact that 
they can be easily implemented in conventional chips 
which are used in various cyber-security solutions. 
C. Quantum RNG's 
It turns out that some things in Nature come in the 
smallest amounts known as quanta. For example the 
electron carries the smallest quantity of charge, e. 
Similarly, there is the smallest quantity of information, 
called qubit. A single quantum of light (photon) can be 
used as a carrier of one qubit, but there are many other 
examples and they are not limited only to elementary 
particles. Qubit can be thought of as a linear combination 
of two bit values: 0 and 1. When a certain type of 
measurement is performed on a qubit it will "project" to 
either pure 0 or pure 1 state in the basis in which 
measurement has been carried out. To illustrate this let us 
consider circularly polarized light entering a polarizing 
beam splitter (PBS), Fig. 1. PBS decomposes polarization 
of incident light and sends linear horizontal component on 
one output port and linear vertical component to the other 
port.  
 
Fig. 1. Circularly polarized photon splits onto a linear horizontal/vertical 
analyzer with 50% chance to finish in either of the two output ports.  
Thus, circularly polarized photon has equal content of 
both linear polarizations but since it cannot be split in half 
it has exactly 50% chance to exit either port. If now we 
label one of the ports as "0" and the other as "1" we 
immediately get a theoretically perfect RNG whose 
randomness is guaranteed by laws of quantum physics. 
Quantum RNG's (based on this or other principles) can be 
made quite good and imperfections (such as non-perfect 
circular polarization, beam splitter port axis misalignment, 
memory effects in photon detectors, etc.) of any type can 
be measured independently of the bit generation process 
so their effect on random numbers can be estimated with 
precision. 
In conclusion, the most distinctive characteristic of 
quantum RNG is that it offers scientific proof of 
randomness. Careful practical applications came 
sufficiently close to theoretical idealization and allow for 
an independent assessment of imperfections which can, if 
required, be dealt with by information theoretic post-
processing (see below). Quantum RNG's are the best 
choice for cryptography and other application which 
critically require true random numbers. Most significant 
drawback of present solutions is that they make use of 
bulky physical objects and therefore can not be 
miniaturized to the chip level using present technologies. 
Nascent science and technology of optical chips offers a 
promising avenue for Q-RNG's. 
D. Post processing 
There exist plethora of post processing algorithms 
whose purpose is to eliminate imperfections in "raw" 
random numbers produced by imperfect hardware 
generators. It is important to note that ad hoc, naive 
processing can lead to unexpected problems. For example 
it is usually considered a good idea to apply von Neumann 
de-biasing scheme in order to completely remove any bias 
from the sequence of bits. However, it is often overlooked 
that this works only if bits are completely independent (no 
correlations). The following extreme example illustrates 
how miserably von Neumann's procedure can fail. Let us 
consider the sequence: 101010101010... It obviously 
readily has no bias. After application of von Neumann de-
biasing the sequence reads: 0000000....  which is a 
maximally biased sequence ! The reason for this un-
expected result is that in the original sequence are 
maximally (anti-correlated). Generally, if the raw string is 
correlated, naïve de-biasing procedure may even increase 
the bias or create other unexpected statistical deficiencies.  
More scrutinized approach is offered by the young 
theory of extractors [8]. A randomness extractor is an 
algorithm that converts a long weakly random sequence 
into a shorter sequence with almost perfect randomness. 
For some randomness sources IT provable extractors exist 
but no single randomness extractor currently exists that 
has been proven to work when applied blindly to any type 
of a high-entropy source. 
Problem with extractor algorithms is that they require 
a memory buffer and a lot of CPU which slows down the 
available bit rate. In our opinion, a good physical RNG 
should be post-processing free. 
E. Randomness evaluation (testing) 
Most randomness tests check one or more statistical 
properties of long sequences of random numbers, for 
example bias, serial autocorrelation etc. Some compilation 
of tests are more oriented towards problems in PRNG's 
(eg. DIEHARD [9]) some more to hardware RNG's (eg. 
ENT [10]) while some are of general nature (eg. NIST 
STS [11]). The unfortunate fact is that there is an infinite 
number of statistical properties which truly random 
numbers must satisfy. Tests themselves are not perfect: 
some contain errors discovered latter [11], [12] or 
constants of questionable precision obtained by simulation 
using "trusted" random number generators. 
The most important notion about statistical testing is 
the following: if a generator passes all known statistical 
tests it does not prove that it is random: it only means that 
it passes all currently known randomness tests. Tomorrow 
it can fail some new test or it already fails in the way 
known only to its constructors. 
Nevertheless, randomness testing is important for 
constructors of RNG's. In some cases (especially for 
quantum RNG's) one can reasonably expect only certain 
type of imperfections and use tests sensitive to these 
problems only. 
 
III. RANDOM NUMBERS IN QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
Quantum cryptography is a protocol of public 
agreement of a symmetric cryptographic key, meaning if 
two parties A and B possess a small common secret key 
then using this protocol they will be able to establish a 
common secret key of any length. This cryptographic 
function is also known as "secret key growing". The 
ultimate goal of establishing a long secret key is to use it 
as a one time pad and thus obtain transfer of data in 
absolute secrecy. There are several mathematically 
identical QC protocols. The first one, named after its 
creators BB84 appeared in 1984 and has been 
experimentally realized in 1991 [1]. 
In the BB84 scenario, Alice and Bob are connected via 
two different channels: the quantum channel (usually well 
shielded optic fiber) capable of conducting single photons 
of light and an un-secured "classical" channel such as a 
telephone line, radio link or internet. 
Here is the simplified schematic of how the protocol 
works.  
Alice can prepare photons in different polarization 
states. In order to establish a secret key, Alice sends to 
Bob a sequence of random numbers encoded in photon 
polarizations as follows:   
"1" is equi-probably encoded either as linear-vertical 
(LV) or left-circular (LC) polarization, while "0"  equi-
probably encoded either as linear-horizontal (LH)  or 
right-circular (RC). Bob, has two polarization analyzers: 
one which can correctly measure linear polarizations (L) 
and the other which can correctly measure circular 
polarizations (C). Alice chooses one polarization at 
random, prepares the photon and sends it to Bob. Bob 
chooses one of the two analyzers at random and measures 
with it the photon received from Alice.  If, by chance, Bob 
has chosen right polarizer he will receive 0 or 1 as sent by 
Alice. If Bob has chosen wrong polarizer he will receive 0 
or 1 with equal probability regardless of what Alice has 
sent. So, after receiving a photon from Alice Bob 
announces (over authenticated but nit secret public 
channel) which polarizer he has just used (L or C). Note 
that this says nothing to potential eavesdropper about the 
value of the bit Bob has got. Alice responds with "Keep it 
!" or "Trash it !". So, bit by bit the two of them are 
building their secret key. Laws of quantum mechanics 
prevent qubit from being faithfully copied so an 
eavesdropper can obtain only a limited information about 
Alice's and Bob's string and furthermore eavesdropping 
can be detected by Alice and Bob. 
It is straightforward to see that the whole protocol 
would be completely insecure if only the eavesdropper 
could calculate (or predict) either Alice's random numbers 
or Bob's random numbers or both. From analysis of the 
secret key rate presented in [13] it is obvious that any 
guessability of random numbers by the eavesdropper 
would leak relevant information to him, thus diminishing 
the effective key rate. It is intriguing (and obvious) that in 
the case that the eavesdropper could calculate the numbers 
exactly, the cryptographic potential of the BB84 protocol 
would be zero. This example shows that the local random 
number generators assumed in BB84 are essential for its 
security and should not be taken for granted.  
Apart from what has been described above, the BB84 
protocol has two more sub-protocols. Namely, due to the 
quantum incoherence, loses in the quantum channel or 
eavesdropping Alice and Bob will not have the exact same 
strings of bits after the first phase, although the two strings 
will have a lot of common information. Therefore the 
second sub-protocol, the „data reconciliation“, is used to 
equalize the two strings, albeit at a cost of leaking some 
small information to an eavesdropper. Fortunately, Alice 
and Bob can calculate a lower limit of their mutual 
information after the two initial phases and then perform 
the privacy amplification phase in order to arrive to a 
shorter but much more private key. These two sub-
protocols require further random numbers.  
The protocol BB84 is considered information 
theoretically proven [14], [15] meaning that an attacker 
simply has no enough information to calculate the 
plaintext even given infinite computing resources. This is 
in strong contrast with widely used "deterministic 
cryptography" (see below for definition) where an attacker 
has enough information to calculate the key except that it 
would probably require insurmountably large computation 
resources and/or time. The caviat with QC is that the 
security proof holds only against family of attacks 
considered in the proof. Unfortunately, with time, it 
became evident that unexpected attacks on QC which 
utilize various quantum effects (such as energy-
momentum co-entanglement in [16]) are feasible which 
makes QC much less "untouchable". 
On top of that, as with any other cryptographic 
procedure, some problems in real-world implementation 
of the protocol, especially of the quantum channel and real 
photon detectors could be used to weaken the 
cryptographic security of the protocol and open pathways 
for attacks. 
A beautiful demonstration of serious weakening and 
even 100 percent breaking of the key without any notice 
to legitimate parties has been made by Makarov et al. in 
2010 [17], [18]. The demonstration has been made on the 
commercial QC system from Swiss company 
IdQuantique, based in Geneva, Switzerland, and one by 
MagiQ Technologies, based in Boston, Massachusetts. 
Improvements that would make QC resistant to those 
attacks are possible and have been proposed [19], but the 
lesson learned from this is that even protocols whose 
theoretical base is proven secure in some scenario are not 
to be automatically assumed immune to all practical 
attacks.  
In conclusion, quantum cryptographic protocol BB84 
requires that both Alice and Bob posses their private 
(local) provable random number generators. This is a 
highly critical requirement. Note that a public server of 
random numbers can not substitute for local generators 
because the random numbers would have to be delivered 
to Alice and Bob in perfect secrecy in the first place, and 
the server would have to be trusted.  
IV. RANDOM NUMBERS IN STATISTICAL 
CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
Statistical cryptography has been invented by U. 
Maurer in 1991. So called SKAPD protocol [20] 
resembles quantum cryptography and likewise consists of 
three sub-protocols. In fact the last two sub-protocols (the 
Data reconciliation and the Privacy amplification) are the 
same as in QC. However, the first sub-protocol, named 
"Advantage distillation" (AD) is completely different and 
it does not involve the quantum channel which potentially 
makes it more practical. Instead, it requires something 
called „binary channel with noise“ which is theoretically a 
classical communication channel complemented with a 
provable RNG.  
The condition for successful key agreement is that 
prior to AD protocol common information shared by Alice 
and Bob is greater that common information shared by 
either Alice and Eve or Bob and Eve. 
The practical problem with SKAPD is that it contains 
an unspoken "zeroth phase" in which Alice and Bob 
obtain their partially correlated initial strings of bits which 
satisfy the above condition. There is no known plausible 
way to make the zeroth phase possible although some 
scenarios have been proposed (scanning surface of the 
Moon, listening to noise from far-away galaxies, taking 
big chunks of internet data, etc.). 
V. RANDOM NUMBERS IN DETERMINISTIC 
CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
What we call here "deterministic cryptography" is 
what is widely known as just "cryptography". It is the 
contemporary cryptography based on Galois groups, 
prime factoring or operations on elliptic curves and use of 
random data. Since all such security protocols are by 
definition deterministic and therefore reversible, the only 
true security resource is that nondeterministic part – a key 
or one-time data which is supposed to be “random”. 
Quality and provability of randomness are therefore 
crucial for security of the whole system. 
It is the fact that the deterministic cryptography is the 
only one in the wider use and that most cryptographers are 
not aware of or do not care of existence of either quantum 
cryptography or statistical cryptography because 
apparently they are not yet practical and/or trusted 
enough. Therefore it is important to understand what 
makes contemporary commercial-grade protocols secure 
and what could be done to get the maximum security out 
of them. Without ambition to make a comprehensive 
review here let us have a look at several examples 
supporting this conclusion. 
1. Diffie-Hellman key establishing protocol [21]. This 
protocol enables the same functionality as the above 
mentioned BB84 and SKAPD protocols and is used for 
example in https secure internet protocol to establish a 
session key. Protocol requires from both parties (Alice and 
Bob) to generate private random data, and after some 
operations send them to each other. More resistant version 
of DH requires further random data used for digital 
signatures. A vulnerability of the PRNG built in an early 
version of Netscape internet browser led to complete 
compromise of the subsequent cryptographic protocol. An 
example is attack to the Netscape's 40 bit RC4-40 [22] 
challenge data and encryption keys, which was able to 
break https protocol in a minute or so, is described in [23]. 
The authors of that article suspect that 128 bit version 
RC4-128 would not be much harder to break either if 
seeding is done in a similar fashion. 
2. RSA public key protocol relies on generation of 
public and private keys separately by Alice and Bob. In 
order to create a private/public pair of keys it is necessary 
to generate two unique, large prim numbers. Already 
calculating prim number candidates involves random 
numbers. After that, candidates need to be tested for 
primality using fast Miller-Rabin test which only works 
properly if fed by random numbers. Additional one-time 
random numbers may be used in the process of actual 
communication. Where high-entropy hardware random 
bits are not available or time-expensive (like on a typical 
PC computer) there is a tendency to "expand" a short 
random string to a long one by pseudo-random methods. 
This approach can create serious cryptographic 
weaknesses because an attacker must guess much smaller 
number of bits than he would in case of use of truly 
random numbers.  
3. Similarly, a research of cryptographic attack on 
partially pseudo-random number generator of an AES 
based commercial cryptographic system is described in 
[24].  
To conclude, in deterministic cryptography random 
numbers are the only part of the protocol which is 
different from point to point and furthermore their true 
randomness is sometimes a prerogative for correct 
calculations. Therefore, even though most of deterministic 
cryptography primitives are not IT secure, using true 
random numbers ensures highest achievable security with 
these methods.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In this survey we show the importance of random 
numbers for strength of cryptographic protocols not only 
for quantum and stochastic cryptographies where random 
numbers are an essential part of data exchanged between 
communicating parties but also for contemporary 
deterministic cryptography where un-guessability and 
maximal entropy of the random numbers used therein 
maximizes overall cryptographic strength. 
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